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THE CYBERWAR OF 1997: TIMIDITY AND
SOPHISTRY AT THE FIRST AMENDMENT
FRONT*
Gary D. Allisont
This is the universal law of vivisystems: higher-level complexities cannot
be inferred by lower-level existences. Nothing-no computer or mind, no
means of mathematics, physics, or philosophy-can unravel the emergent
pattern dissolved in the parts without actually playing it out....
[R]unning a system is the quickest, shortest, and only sure method to
discern emergent structures latent in it.... That leads us to wonder...
what is contained in a human that will not emerge until we are all inter-
connected by wires and politics? The most unexpected things will brew in
the bionic hivelike supermind.'
[Riegardless of the strength of the government's interest in protecting
children, "[tihe level of discourse reaching the mailbox simply cannot be
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox."'2
I. INTRODUCMION
During the 1996 term, the United States Supreme Court decided one of the
nation's most important First Amendment cases, the first involving federal
regulation of the Internet.3 Reno v. ACLU4 attracted great attention, because it
was a cultural war. On one side were those who viewed the Internet as a moral
cesspool threatening to engulf children in depravity.5 On the other were those
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's'Guide to the 1996 Supreme Court
Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, October 31, 1997.
t Professor of Law and Director of the Public Policy and Regulation Certificate Program, University of
Tulsa College of Law.
1. KEVIN KELLY, Our OF CONTROL: TE ISE OF NEO-BIOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION 13 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Out of Control].
2. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) (quoting from Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 74-5 (1983)).
3. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996). "The Internet is not a physical or tan-
gible entity, but rather a giant network whhch interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer
networks. It is thus a network of networks." ld.
4. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
5. See Elsa Brenner, Censorship at Issue on the Internet, N.Y. TiME, Jan. 28, 1996, at 13WC. Ms.
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who believe the Internet, if left unregulated, is the gateway to earth's final
frontier, cyberspace, a vast network of computer networks containing unfath-
omed economic, technological and philosophical bounties." The champions of
Brenner's article points out, among other things, the psychological dangers children face on the Internet, as
follows:
Psychologists say that even though minors have always sought out medical books and other graphic
pictures of body parts, the Internet is taking access to sexually explicit materials to new levels.
"The access is so much more immediate and comprehensive on the Internet," said Dr. Michelle M.
Weill, a clinical psychologist in Orange, Calif., and a national expert on the psychology of technolo-
gy.
"The danger has to do with each child's development and chronological age," she said. "We can't
protect them from all of the ills of society, but we have to monitor their exposure to what they're
ready for."
Dr. Weill said youngsters who are exposed to sexually explicit material that they are not emotionally
or physically prepared for can become terrified, experience disrupted sleep and "get a skewed per-
spective" on life.
Id. In addition, it has been reported that Internet chat rooms have been sources of dangers to children, as they
sometimes are entered by adults seeking to have cybersexual encounters with children. See Stacie Zoo Berg,
Helping Kids to Surf Safely, WASH. TMES, Aug. 4, 1997, at 42.
6. In Out of Control, Kevin Kelly gives a fascinating preview of what our future could be in a world
where everyone is connected to the Net. He observes that "Networking at that scale would truly revolutionize
almost every business. It would alter:.
* What we make
* How we make it
* How we decide what to make
* the nature of the economy we make it in."
KELLY, supra note 1, at 186.
Kelly also offers an executive summary of the characteristics of the emerging net-economy. He be-
lieves the net-economy will exhibit the following traits:
* Distributed Cores-... Companies ... become societies of work centers distributed in owner-
ship and geography.
* Adaptive Technologies-If you are not in real time, you are dead. Bar codes, laser scanners,
cellular phones, 700-numbers, and satellite uplinks which are directly connected to cash regis-
ters, polling devices, and delivery trucks steer the production of goods .....
* Flex Manufacturing-Smaller numbers of items can be produced in smaller time periods with
smaller equipment... Modular equipment, not standing inventory, and computer-aided design
shrink product development cycles from years to weeks.
* Mass Customization-.. . All products are manufactured to personal specifications, but at mass
production prices.
* Industrial Ecology--Closed loop, no waste, zero pollution manufacturing; products designed for
disassembly; and a gradual shift to biologically compatible techniques .....
* Global Accounting-Even small businesses become global .... Unexploited, undeveloped eco-
nomic "frontiers" disappear geographically. The game shifts from zero-sum ... to positive sum,
where the ... rewards go to those able to play the system as a unified whole .....
* Coevolved Customers-Customers are trained and educated by the company, and then the com-
pany is trained and educated by the customer. Products ... become updatable franchises that
coevolve in continuous improvement with customer use .....
* Knowledge Based-. . (D]ata is cheap, and in the large volumes on the network, a nui-
sance.... Coordination of data into knowledge becomes priceless.
* Free Bandwidth-Connecting is free, switching is expensive. [Cihoosing who, what, and when
to send, or what and when to get is the trick. Selecting what not to connect to is key.
* Increasing Returns-.. . A network's value grows faster than the number of members added to
it.. .because of the exponentially greater numbers of conversations between each member, both
old and new.
* Digital Money-Everyday digital cash replaces batch-mode paper money. All accounts become
real time.
* Underwire Economies-.. . Creative edges and fringe areas expand, but now they are invisibly
connected on encrypted networks. Distributed cores and electronic money drives economic activ-
ity underwire.
KELLY, supra note 1, at 200-01.
Kelly also offers a spiritually intriguing view of the philosophical challenges that may emerge from a
networld. He observes:
There is a sense in which a global mind also emerges in a network culture. The global mind is the
union of computer and nature .... It is a very large complexity of indeterminate shape governed by
an invisible hand of its own. We humans will be unconscious of what the global mind ponders...,
2
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Internet prevailed, but their victory may not be the complete and final victory
they sought.
I. THE CDA
At issue in Reno was the constitutionality of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA).7 It was enacted at the height of the family-values political
movement during the 1996 election year. The specific sections of the CDA at
issue in Reno outlawed the use of:
(1) a telecommunications device to make, create, solicit and transmit
knowingly "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipi-
ent... is under 18 years of age... ;" [the indecent transmission provi-
sion];'
(2) "an interactive computer service to send to a specific person under
18 years of age.... any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image,
or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs ... ." [the specific person provi-
sion];9
(3) "an interactive computer service.., to display in a manner available
to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or de-
scribes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs ... ." [the display
provision]."
The CDA terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" signify that it is intended
to regulate speech that is not obscene and, therefore is protected by the First
Amendment despite being regarded by many as indecent with respect to adults
or children." However, Congress did attempt to reduce the CDA's potential
impact on protected speech by including in the CDA several affirmative defens-
because the design of a mind does not allow the parts to understand the whole. The particular
thoughts of the global mind-and its subsequent actions-will be out of our control and beyond our
understanding. Thus, network economics will breed a new spiritualism.
Our primary difficulty in comprehending the global mind of a network culture will be that it does not
have a central 'T to appeal to.... In the future, the quest will be to find the "I am" of the global
mind, the source of its coherence. Many souls will lose all they have searching for it--and many will
be the theories of where the global mind's "I am" hides. But it will be a never-ending quest....
KELLY, supra note 1, at 202.
7. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered sec-
tions of 47 U.S.C. (1997)).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1997).
9. Id. § 223(d)(1)(A).
10. Id. § 223(d)(1)(B).
11. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1996). In fact, at trial the appellees in Reno did
not challenge the CDA as it applied to obscenity and child pornography since those types of speech were
criminalized before the CDA's enactment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464-64 (obscene material), 2251-52 (child por-
nography). See also N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747(1982) (holding that material not obscene as to adults may
nevertheless be left unprotected by the First Amendment because it is obscene as to children); Miller v.
California,413 U.S. 15 (1973) (articulating the constitutional standard of obscenity).
1997]
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es for those who may be prosecuted under it. These defenses are available to
those
(1) "tak[ing], in good faith, reasonable, effective and appropriate actions
under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to...
[unlawful] communication[s], which may involve any appropriate mea-
sures to restrict minors from such communications, including any measure
which is feasible under available technology;'2
(2) "restrict[ing] access to... [unlawful] communication[s] by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number."' 3
III. THE DEcISION OF THE THREE-JUDGE DISmiCT COURT
Almost immediately after its enactment on February 8, 1996, the CDA was
attacked'in federal district court on grounds that its indecent transmission, spe-
cific person, and display provisions are facially unconstitutional. 4 All chal-
lenges to the CDA were consolidated into one action before a three-judge feder-
al district court.'5 After making exhaustive findings concerning the nature of
cyperspace and the Internet,"6 the content of material on the Internet, 7 and
technologies and procedures for protecting Internet suffers from exposures to
indecent material,'8 the three-judge district court ruled unanimously that the
CDA is unconstitutional on its face. 9 Nevertheless, each of the judges used
reasoning significantly different from the reasoning of the others to come to that
conclusion.
A. Judge Sloviter's Overbreadth Analysis
Judge Sloviter held that the CDA is constitutionally overbroad in that it
"reaches speech subject to the full protection of the First Amendment, at least
for adults." In support of this conclusion, she identified several examples of
protected speech that might generate CDA prosecutions, including:
* The award winning play Angels in America, which graphically portrays
homosexuality and the plague of AIDS;
12. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A).
13. Id. § 223(e)(5)(B).
14. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827. President Clinton signed the act containing the CDA, the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, into law on Feb. 8, 1996. Constitutional challenges to the CDA were filed in federal
district court on the day of its enactment See id. These challenges attacked the facial constitutionality of the
CDA in order that the case could receive expedited review by the United States Supreme Court as provided
for in the CDA. See CDA, § 561, 110 Stat. 142.
15. See id. at 827.
16. See id. at 828-38 (Findings of Fact 1-48).
17. See id. at 842-45 (Findings of Fact 74-89).
18. See id. at 838-42, 845-49 (Findings of Fact 49-73, 90-116).
19. See id. at 849. The court held the indecent transmission provision to be unconstitutional on its face
as to indecency and specific persons and display provisions to be wholly unconstitutional on their faces. See
id.
20. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
[Vol. 33:103
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* News articles describing the disturbing practice of female genital mutila-
tion;
* Photographs in National Geographic and travel magazines of sculptures in
India that show couples copulating in various positions;
* News articles describing a brutal prison rape;
* Safer Sex advice from organizations seeking to prevent the spread of
AIDS;
* "Contemporary films, plays and books showing or describing sexual activi-
ties," such as Leaving Las Vegas; and
* Controversial paintings and art photographs such as Francesco Clemente's
painting "Labyrinth" and Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs of a nude
man with an erect penis."
While they are controversial, and maybe even indecent, these speech exam-
ples are not obscene because they "contain valuable literary, artistic, or educa-
tional value to older minors as well as adults."'  Nevertheless, Judge Sloviter
believed these examples of protected speech could generate CDA prosecutions
because they might be deemed "indecent" or "patently offensive" in at least one
community receiving them over the Intemet.'
Most importantly, Judge Sloviter found there was a high risk that such
prosecutions would occur because, with the exception of e-mail from one per-
son to another, Internet speakers do not have any control or knowledge over
who receives their messages.24
As a consequence, the CDA subjects Internet speakers to great risk of
prosecution unless they confine their communications to what is appropriate for
children. Such a limitation constitutes a complete ban on certain indecent, but
constitutionally protected, communications among adults.O
21. See id. at 853, 855.
22. See hi. at 852.
23. See id. at 853.
24. See id. at 854. Judge Sloviter's finding was supported by the following findings of fact
* "[A] user of the Internet may speak or listen interchangeably, blurring the distinction between
'speakers' and 'listeners."' Id. at 843 (Findings of Fact 79).
* "[U]nlike traditional media, the barriers to entry as a speaker do not differ significantly from the
barriers to entry as a listener.... [IThe receiver can and does become the content provider, and
vice-versa." Id. at 843-44 (Findings of Fact 80).
* "Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other Internet users world-
wide." Id. at 844 (Findings of Fact 85).
* "Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from entering
any community. Unlike the newspaper, broadcast station, or cable system, Internet technology
necessarily gives a speaker a worldwide audience" Id. (Fidings of Fact 86).
* "There is no effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user... accessing material
through e-mail, mail-exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms." Id. at 845 (Finding of Fact 90) (for
details backing Finding of Fact 90 see Findings of Fact 91-92). Id.
* "Unlike other forms of communication on the Internet, there is technology [Common Gateway
Interface (cgi) script] by which an operator of a World Wide Web server may interrogate a user
of a Web site[,] ... and thereby screen visitors by requesting a credit card number or adult pass-
word." Id. (Findings of Fact 95).
* "Content providers who publish on the World Wide Web via one of the large commercial online
servies ... could not use an online age verification system that requires cgi script[,] ... [and
t]here is no method current available for Web page publishers who lack access to cgi script to
screen recipients online for age." Id. at 845-46 (Findings of Fact 96).
25. See id. at 854.
26. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
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Judge Sloviter also concluded that the inability of many Internet content
providers to limit who receives their messages forces them to "choose between
silence and the risk of prosecution" as to material that is arguably indecent, and
that such a choice "strikes at the heart of speech of adults as well as minors."'
This conclusion was closely tied to Judge Solviter's rejection of the
government's arguments that the CDA's affirmative defenses effectively narrow
its reach so that the CDA is narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling gov-
ernment interest.' Both conclusions are premised on findings of fact that it is
not feasible technologically or economically for many Internet speakers to use
the CDA defenses.29 Additionally, she noted that even if technology were
27. Id. at 855. See infra note 29.
28. See id. at 855-57.
29. See id. at 856. See especially the following Findings of Fact
* "Verification of a credit card number over the Internet is not now technically possible." Id. at
846 (Findings of Fact 97).
* "Verification by credit card, if and when operational, will remain economically and practically
unavailable for many... non-commercial [content providers]." Id. (Findings of Fact 98) (for
supporting details see Findings of Fact 99-100).
* "Credit card verification would significantly delay the retrieval of information on the Internet.
[EIxcessive delay disrupts the 'flow' on the Internet and stifles both 'hedonistic' and 'goal-
directed' browsing." Id. (Findings of Fact 101).
* "Imposition of a credit card requirement would completely bar adults who do not have a credit
card and lack the resources to obtain one from accessing any blocked material. At this time,
credit card verification is effectively unavailable to a substantial number of Internet content
providers as a potential defense to the CDA." Id. (Findings of Fact 102).
* "[E]xisting [adult verification] systems which appear to be used for accessing commercial porno-
graphic sites, charge users for their services." Id. at 846-47 (Findings of Fact 103).
" "At least some, if not almost all, non-commercial organizations ... regard charging listeners to
access their speech as contrary to their goals of making their materials available to a wide audi-
ence free of charge." Id. (Findings of Fact 104).
* "It would not be [administratively and economically] feasible for many non-commercial organi-
zations to design their own adult access code screening systems .... Id. (Findings of Fact
105).
* "There is evidence suggesting that adult users.., would be discouraged from retrieving infor-
mation that required use of a credit card or password.... There is concern by commercial con-
tent providers that age verification requirements would decrease advertising and revenue because
advertisers depend on a demonstration that the sites are widely available and frequently visited."
Id. (Findings of Fact 106).
* "Even if credit card verification or adult password verification was implemented, the government
presented no testimony as to how such systems could ensure that the user of the password or
credit card is in fact over 18." Id. (Findings of Fact 107).
* "The feasibility and effectiveness of 'tagging' to restrict children from accessing 'indecent'
speech ... has not been established." Id. (Findings of Fact 108).
" "[flagging ... would require all content providers that post arguably 'indecent' material to
review all of their online content, a task that would be extremely burden some for organizations
[such as public libraries] that provide large amount of material online which cannot afford to
pay a large staff to review all of that material." Id. (Findings of Fact 110).
* "The task of screening and tagging cannot be done... by using software which screens for
certain words .... [because] determinations as to what is indecent require human judgment." Id.
(Findings of Fact 111).
* "To be effective, [tagging] would require a worldwide consensus among speakers to use the
same tag to label 'indecent' material. There is currently no such consensus, and no Internet
speaker currently labels its speech with... any ... widely-recognized label." Id. at 848 (Find-
ings of Fact 113).
* Tagging also assumes the existence of software that recognizes the tags and takes appropriate
action .... Until such software exists, all speech on the Internet will continue to travel to
whomever requests it, without hindrance." Id. (Findings of Fact 114).
* "There is no way that a speaker can use current technology to know if a listener is using screen-
ing software." Id. (Findings of Fact 115).
* "Tags can not currently activate or deactivate themselves depending on the age or location of the
receiver. [Content providers] ... would be unable to embed tags that block [their] speech only
in communities where it may be regarded as indecent. [They] ... must choose either to tag
[their] site[s] (blocking [their] speech in all communities) or not to tag, blocking [their] speech
6
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available for meeting these defenses, the CDA would still impose unacceptable
burdens on the ability of some classes of Internet speakers to engage in protect-
ed speech." In the end, Judge Sloviter doubted that any defense could cure the
CDA's potential to chill protected speech, because the CDA is too vague to
enable Internet speakers to determine what speech is invalid.3
B. Judge Buckwalter's Vagueness Analysis
Although he agreed "that current technology is inadequate to provide a
safe harbor to most speakers on the Internet,"'32 Judge Buckwalter's conclusion
that the CDA violated both the First and Fifth Amendments was based primari-
ly on his determination that the CDA terms "indecent" and "patently offensive"
are unconstitutionally vague.33 In support of his vagueness holding, Judge
Buckwalter found that the CDA failed to define the meaning of the term "inde-
cent," the FCC has not promulgated regulations defining indecency in the medi-
um of cyberspace, and therefore "[i]ndecent in this statute is an undefined word
which, standing alone, offers no guidelines whatsoever as to its parameters." '34
Judge Buckwalter also found the term "patently offensive," as used in the
specific person and display provisions, to be unconstitutionally vague,35 even
though it is expressly limited to speech about sexual or excretory activities or
organs and is to be measured by contemporary community standards. 6 In de-
veloping definitions for the word "indecent" as applied to telephone service or
broadcasting, the FCC specified it should be measured by contemporary com-
munity standards for the telephone medium37 and the broadcast medium re-
in none.' Id. (Findings of Fact 116).
30. See id. at 856. See supra note 29 (Findings of Fact 110).
31. See id.
32. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858.
33. Id. at 858. Judge Buckwalter began his vagueness analysis by noting his belief "that an exacting or
strict scrutiny of a statute which attempts to criminalize protected speech requires a word by word look... to
be sure that it clearly sets forth as precisely as possible what constitutes a violation ... " Id. Judge
Buckwalter believed this scrutiny is required to avoid the pitfalls of vague criminal statutes, which violate the
Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment in a variety of ways, including.
* Failing to provide "a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohib-
ited[, thereby] trap[ping] the innocent[;]"
* Failing to provide "explicit standards for those who apply them[, so as to avoid] ... the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application[;]"
* "[A]but[ting] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment Freedoms ... [so as] to inhibit the exer-
cise of [those] freedoms"
Id. at 860 (quoting from Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09(1972)).
34. Id. at 861. In so doing, he rejected the government's argument that the term "indecent" in the inde-
cent transmission provision should be equated with the term "patently offensive" as used in the specific per-
son and display provisions. Id. The term "patently offensive" was more specifically defined in the specific
person and display provisions as being "measured by contemporary community standards" and referring to
communications depicting or describing "sexual or excretory activities or organs." 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)
(Supp. 1997). Judge Buckwalter contended that if Congress intended the two terms to mean the same thing,
the word indecent in the indecent transmission provision would have contained that same definition. ACLU,
929 F. Supp at 861.
35. See i. at 862-64.
36. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(Supp. 1997).
37. See Dial Info. Servs. v. Thomburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1540 (2d Cir. 1991).
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spectively." This caused Judge Buckwalter to find it constitutionally fatal that
Congress made no "effort to conform the restricting terms [contemporary com-
munity standards] to the medium of cyperspace." '39 He also found that
Congress' attempt to establish a national CDA community standard, so that
CDA prosecutions would proceed only against speech deemed indecent in every
U.S. community,' conflicted with obscenity law precedent establishing the
local community as the source of contemporary community standards.4 Judge
Buckwalter then concluded that "[t]his conflict inevitably leaves the reader of
the CDA unable to discern the relevant 'community standard,' and will un-
doubtedly cause Internet users to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' than if
the community standard to be applied were clearly defined."'42
Attempting to save the CDA from the vagueness attack, the government
virtually promised that it would not initiate CDA prosecutions unless the mate-
rial was pornographic and lacked serious value.43 Judge Buckwalter rejected
this offer, contending that the CDA covered more than pornographic speech
without serious value,' and well-intentioned prosecutors cannot protect citi-
zens from the possibility of arbitrary enforcement.'
Finally, Judge Buckwalter found that the CDA's affirmative defenses were
also unconstitutionally vague, because they do "not contain any description of
what, other than credit card verification and adult identification codes.., will
protect a speaker from prosecution."' As a consequence, "individuals attempt-
ing to comply with the statute presently have no clear indication of what actions
will ensure that they will be insulated from criminal sanctions under the
CDA."
47
C. Judge Daizell's Medium-Specific Analysis
In contrast to Judge Buckwalter, Judge Dalzell found that the terms "inde-
cent" and "patently offensive" are not unconstitutionally vague.' Nevertheless,
38. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (broadcast radio).
39. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 862-63.
40. See id. at 863-64.
41. See id. at 863 (referring to Sable Comms. Of Cal. Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989) (to tele-
phone); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
42. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 863.
43. See id. at 863.
44. See id. at 863-64.
45. See id. at 864. Indeed, he supported this conclusion by pointing to government evidence and testimo-
ny "ilustrat[ing] the possibility of arbitrary enforcement." A government expert said that seven dirty words
would probably trigger a CDA prosecution, but in its brief, the government denied this assertion. Id. More-
over, "[tihe Justice Department attorney could not respond to numerous questions from the court regarding
whether... artistic photographs of a nude man with an erect penis, depictions of Indian statues portraying
different methods of copulation, or the transcript of a scene from a contemporary play about AIDS could be
considered indecent under the Act." Id.
46. l at 864. He also noted that the CDA authorizes the FCC "to specify measures that might satisfy
this defense," but that the CDA will not permit the FCC's views to be definitive in any given case. Id. See
also 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(6).
47. Id. at 864.
48. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 868-69. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Dalzell found that Congress
intended for the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" to have the same meaning. Id. at 868-69. He also
[Vol. 33:103
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he still held the CDA to be unconstitutional primarily because of his conclusion
that the Internet, a new medium with unique attributes, would be greatly dis-
rupted if the CDA's restrictions were upheld.' Judge Dalzell reached his con-
clusion by performing a medium-specific First Amendment analysis," an anal-
ysis he believed he was obligated to perform by the United States Supreme
Court's doctrine that each medium is to be treated differently for First Amend-
ment purposes."1 Such medium-specific analyses involve examining "the un-
derlying technology of the communication to find the proper fit between First
Amendment values and competing interests." 2
Of major importance to Judge Dalzell was his finding that the Internet did
not suffer from a scarcity of operating resources. 3 This was important, be-
cause scarcity of frequencies within the broadcast spectrum is the chief underly-
ing technological characteristic that caused the United States Supreme Court to
uphold government content regulation of protected speech disseminated by
broadcast media.O Therefore, Judge Dalzell concluded that it was inappropriate
to apply precedents arising from the regulation of broadcast speech to issues
concerning the regulation of speech on the Internet. In particular, he rejected
the government's contention that FCC v. Pacifica Found.,6 a case in which
the Supreme Court held that the government could impose content restrictions
on offensive speech disseminated by the broadcast media and punish broadcast-
concluded that this shared meaning was derived from the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of the term "inde-
cency" in Pacifica, from which was fashioned an FCC definition of "indecency" that survived vagueness
attacks in three U.S. Court of Appeal circuits. Id. at 868 (citing to Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56
F.3d 105, 123-25 (D.C. Cir. 1995)), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995); Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938
F.2d 1535, 1540 (2d Cir. 1991); info. Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 876 (9th Cir. 1991). He
then opined it can be fairly implied that the U.S. Supreme Court "did not believe its own interpretation [in
Pacifica of the term indecency] invite[s] 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement' or 'abut[s] upon sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment Freedoms." ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 869. From this, he held that "plaintiffs'
vagueness challenge is not likely to succeed on the merits." Id.
49. See id. at 872-83.
50. See id. at 877-82.
51. See id. at 873-74 (efficiently documenting the development of the United States Supreme Court's
doctrine that for Fist Amendment purposes different communications media are to be treated differently in
accordance with their "differing natures, values, abuses and dangers"). Id. at 873, (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J. concurring)). The documentation shows that the Supreme Court has been
faithful to this doctrine by actually establishing different First Amendment rules for different media, includ-
ing:
* cable television, Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994);
* billboards, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981);
* drive-in movie theaters, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975);
* print, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); and
* broadcast radio and television, Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
52. Id. at 873.
53. See'id. at 877 (where Judge Dazell states that both the "plaintiffs and the government agree that
Internet communication is an abundant and growing resource"). Id.
54. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 877. The Supreme Court has cited the scarcity of broadcast frequencies
as a justification for upholding content regulation of broadcast speech in several cases, including:
* CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981);
* FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978);
* CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1973);
* Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
55. See id.
56. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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ers who did not comply,'7 is relevant to the issue of the CDA's constitutional-
ity.5 8
Turning to the technological characteristics of the Internet, Judge Dalzell
identified several unique Internet attributes he believed "render unconstitutional
any regulation of protected speech on this new medium."'59 They include:
* very low entry barriers that are substantially identical for speakers
and listeners;
* significant access to all who wish to speak;
* relative parity among speakers in their ability to disseminate their
ideas;
* a system designed to promote the speed of message delivery without
consideration to message content; and
* astounding diversity in the content of messages disseminated.'e
According to Judge Dalzell, these attributes have enabled the Internet to be-
come "the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country-and
indeed the world-has yet seen,"' thereby entitling the Internet to "the highest
protection from governmental intrusion.' ' 2 Having documented how the CDA
would severely diminish the Internet's unique attributes and its ability to contin-
ue being the most participatory market place of ideas,' Judge Dalzell held,
57. See id. at 742-51.
58. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 874-77. In Pacifica, the U.S. Supreme Court used two broadcast charac-
teristics other than scarcity of broadcast frequencies-its "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans" and the way it is "uniquely accessible to children"-to justify allowing government content regu-
lation of broadcast speech. See Pacifica 438 U.S. at 748-49. Nevertheless, Judge Dalzell stated that the Su-
preme Court impliedly limited the application of Pacifica to media facing scarce operating resources when it
declined to extend the First Amendment precedents established for the broadcast media to cable television.
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 876-77. For he believed cable television is no less pervasive in Americans' lives or
less accessible to children that are the broadcast media. Id.
59. Id. at 867. ACLU also addressed the Internet's key attributes and how the CDA will interfere with
them. See id. at 877-82.
60. See id. at 877.
61. Id. at 881. Indeed, Judge Dalzell seems to have bought whole cloth the plaintiffs' view that the
Internet has "democratized" communication as he delivered the following tribute to the wonders of the
Internet
[lI]ndividual citizens of limited means can speak to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to
them. Federalists and Anti-federalists may debate the structure of their government nightly, but these
debates occur in newsgroups or chat rooms rather than pamphlets. Moder-day Luthers still post their
theses, but to electronic bulletin boards rather than the door of the Wittenberg Schlosskirche. More
mundane (but from a constitutional perspective, equally important) dialogue occurs between aspiring
artists, or French cooks, or dog lovers or fly fishermen.
Id. at 881.
62. Id. at 883. Judge Dalzell eloquently supported this conclusion in the penultimate paragraph of his
opinion, wherein he stated-
True it is that many find some of the speech on the Internet to be offensive, and amid the din of
cyberspace many hear discordant voices that they regard as indecent. The absence of governmental
regulation of Internet content has unquestionably produced a kind of chaos, but as one of the
plaintiffs' experts put it... : What achieved success was the very chaos that the Internet is. The
strength of the Internet is that chaos.
Id. Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and ca-
cophony of the unfettered speech the First Amendment protects. (Footnotes omitted).
63. See id. at 881. Judge Dalzell identified several detrimental impacts the CDA would have on the
Internet, including.
* Making, for the first time, speech content a major factor in determining the extent to which
persons will choose to become Internet speakers; See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 877-78;
* Raising the barriers to entry of those who would have to deploy some type of technology capa-
ble of keeping children from being exposed to their speech; See id. at 878;
* Diminishing the diversity of speech disseminated on the Internet, as persons censor themselves
rather than risk a possible CDA prosecution; See id.;
10
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without hesitation, "that the CDA is unconstitutional on its face.' "M
As to the notion that protecting children from indecent material should
take priority over preserving the free-wheeling international dialogue taking
place on the Internet, Judge Dalzell argued it "is as dangerous as it is compel-
ling. ' Thus, he opined that "[riegulations that 'drive certain ideas or view-
points from the marketplace' for children's benefits ... risk destroying the very
'political system and cultural life' ... they will inherit when they come of
age." After hypothesizing that laws designed to protect children from inde-
cent speech would be held unconstitutional as applied to newspapers, novels,
the village green, and the mail,67 he declared that the result should be the same
for the Internet because it "is a far more speech-enhancing medium than print,
the village green, or the mails." Moreover, Judge Dalzell noted that uphold-
ing the CDA would destroy the free-wheeling international Internet dialogue
without really shielding children from Internet pornography, because much of it
originates from foreign sources.69 He therefore suggested that society be con-
tent with the existing means of protecting children from pornography, which in-
cludes prosecution of those who expose children to obscenity, parental acquisi-
tion and installation of an increasing variety of screening technologies, and
direct parental supervision of children while they use the Internet.7
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The United States Supreme Court upheld the three-judge district court's
holding that the CDA violated First Amendment Free speech rights,7 but it
declined to consider whether it also violated Fifth Amendment Due Process
Rights.' In doing so, it managed to form a seven justice majority opinion on all
relevant issues. Moreover, the two justices not joining the majority opinion
disagreed in only one minor respect: they would have upheld the CDA only to
the extent that its indecent transmission and specific person provisions "prohibit
the use of indecent speech in communications between [one] adult and one or
more minors."74
The district court presented the Supreme Court with a menu of justifica-
tions for declaring the CDA unconstitutional. In supporting its decision, the
majority employed a smorgasbord of justifications that ratified substantially the
district court's vagueness and overbreadth holdings.!5 It also adopted much of
the district court's reasoning in rejecting various defenses offered by the gov-
* Reducing significantly the relative parity among Internet speakers in favor of commercial speak-
ers who can afford verification technology, would charge users of their sites, or engage in
speech with mass appeal; See id. at 878-79; and
* Reducing adult participation in the Internet as speakers leave or refuse to enter Internet and
others alter their speech to avoid CDA prosecutions. See id. at 879.
64. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883.
65. Id. at 882.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. See id. at 882.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 882-83.
70. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883.
71. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997).
72. See id. at 2341.
73. See id. at 2333. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Scalia, Kenne-
dy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer. See id.
74. Id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. See id. at 2344-46 (vagueness), 2346-50 (overbreadth).
1997]
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enment 6 Unfortunately, the majority opinion reads as if it were written pri-
marily from a defensive posture, and therefore it did not adopt Judge Dalzell's
bold affirmative rationale for keeping the Internet free from content regulation.
A. Cases Allowing the Regulation of Indecent Speech Rejected
The majority rejected government arguments that this case should be con-
trolled by three Supreme Court decisions which upheld government content
regulations designed to protect children from material that is not obscene as to
adults.' These cases were:
* City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.," in which the Court upheld
zoning ordinances to keep adult movies out of residential areas;79
* Pacifica, which upheld administrative sanctions against a radio station that
broadcast a monologue entitled "Filthy Words," because the repeated use
of certain words referring to sexual or excretory activities and organs were
deemed patently offensive in the context of an afternoon broadcast with
children in the audience;'
* Ginsberg v. New York,' which permitted the government to forbid the
sales to minors of materials not obscene as to adults because the state has
an independent interest in the welfare of its youth and "the parents' claim
to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
basic in the structure of our society."'
Renton was rejected as a controlling precedent because the purpose of the
zoning was not to prohibit the dissemination of speech, but to protect the neigh-
borhood from secondary effects of adult movie theaters, such as crime and
lower property values.8 3 This made Renton a time, place and manner regulation
case," which means it is inapplicable to Reno since "the CDA is a content-
based blanket restriction on speech."'
The majority joined Judge Dalzell in rejecting Pacifica as a controlling
precedent, but it did so on grounds much different than those of Judge
Dalzell." Whereas Judge Dalzell held that Pacifica applied only to media with
scarce operating resources, the majority emphasized other differences between
the circumstances facing the broadcast media and those faced by the Internet.
First, the Pacifica administrative order was issued by an agency that had long
regulated out-of-the-ordinary program content by determining when, not wheth-
er, it could be heard.' In contrast, the CDA banned the dissemination of cer-
tain speech on the Internet without the benefit of an "evaluation by an agency
familiar with the [Internet's] unique characteristics." 8 Second, Pacifica did not
76. See id. at 2341-43 (rejecting the use of prior precedents upholding government content regulations to
insulate children from indecent material). Id. at 2343-44 (rejecting content regulation precedents from broad-
casting cases because of the differences in operational characteristics between broadcast media and the
Internet). Id
77. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341-43.
78. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
79. See id. at 54.
80. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730, 732 (1978).
81. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
82. Id. at 639-40.
83. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2342 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986)).
84. See i&
85. Id.
86. Compare id. at 2341-42 with ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 874-77 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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criminalize the targeted speech,89 whereas the CDA imposes criminal penalties
on violators. 9' Third, radio broadcasts have historically "received the most lim-
ited First Amendment protection,"'9 primarily because of their propensity to
subject listeners to unwanted material.' At the time of the CDA's enactment,
the Internet had never been subject to content regulation, and the district court
expressly found "that the risk of encountering indecent material by accident is
remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to access specific mate-
rial. 9 3
Finally, the majority distinguished the law at issue in Ginsburg from the
CDA in four important respects. First, unlike the CDA, the Ginsburg law al-
lowed parents to give their own children access to offensive materials.'" Sec-
ond, the Ginsburg law applied only to commercial transactions, while the CDA
covers commercial and non-commercial dissemination of speech.9' Third, the
Ginsburg law required the material to be obscene as to minors, meaning it had
to be "utterly without redeeming social importance for minors,"'96 but the CDA
applies to more material than that which would be deemed obscene and con-
tains undefined terms that make it difficult for speakers to know what material
is proscribed.' Fourth, the Ginsburg statute applied only to minors under age
17, while the CDA applies to minors under age 18, thus expanding by a year
the class of persons who can be denied access to certain material."
B. Internet and Broadcasting Media Differences Identified
As did the district court, the Supreme Court distinguished the characteris-
tics of the Internet from those of broadcast media to justify refusing to apply
content-restrictive precedents established in broadcast cases to the Internet. '
The Supreme Court and the district court agreed that broadcast precedents
should not be applied to the Internet, however, they did not use the same rea-
soning to come to that conclusion. The district court relied simply on the
Internet not sharing the broadcast media's scarce operational resource character-
istic.'" The majority found that three characteristics that were important fac-
tors in the broadcast media being subjected to more speech regulation than
other media:
* A history of extensive government regulation;'0 '
* Scarcity of available frequencies;' 2 and
* An invasive nature.0 3
It then observed that the Internet has never been subjected to government regu-
lation, 4" Internet "communications ... do not 'invade' an individual's home or
89. See id. (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978)).
90. See id.
91. Id. at 2342 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748).
92. See id.
93. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.





99. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
100. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 873-74 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
101. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399-400 (1969)).
102. See id. at 2343 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).
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appear on one's computer screen unbidden ... " and, as a provider of low-
cost communications capacity to over 40 million users world-wide, the Internet
cannot be considered afflicted with a scarcity of operational resources."°
Although it relied on all the differences between the Internet and broadcast
media discussed above to justify treating them differently for First Amendment
purposes, the Supreme Court gave primary emphasis to the Internet's non-inva-
sive nature. It did so by extolling Sable as the case most applicable to this one,
because the medium in Sable, telephones used to access pornography, "requires
the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communication."" This
finding in Sable is practically identical to district court finding 89, in which it
was determined that "the receipt of information on the Internet requires a series
of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a
dial." 08
C. The CDA Deemed Unconstitutionally Vague
The majority agreed with Judge Buckwalter that the CDA is unconstitu-
tionally vague," however, without explanation, the majority declined to fol-
low Judge Buckwalter's lead and hold that the CDA's vagueness constituted a
violation of the Fifth Amendment."0 It did agree with Judge Buckwalter that
the CDA's failure to define the terms "indecent" and "in context, depicts or de-
scribes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs" left the CDA so vague as to
violate the First Amendment.' However, Judge Buckwalter's opinion provid-
ed a detailed analysis of why the CDA was unconstitutionally vague, while the
majority opinion simply stated that the CDA's flaw was its failure to define
further the terms cited above."' Nevertheless, both opinions agreed on why
this vagueness violated the First Amendment: it prevents speakers from under-
standing what speech is invalid and subjects them to criminal penalties if their
best guesses prove to be incorrect, thus, the CDA "may well cause speakers to
remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and
images."' 3
The bulk of the majority's vagueness analysis constituted a refutation of
the government's allegation that the CDA's terms were no less vague than those
of Miller's obscenity standard,"4 a task not undertaken by Judge Buckwalter.
Miller's obscenity test is:
(a) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." 5
105. Id.
106. See id. at 2344.
107. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28).
108. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
109. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-46.
110. Compare id. at 2344 with ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858-65 (Judge Buckwalter's opinion).
111. See Rena, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
112. Compare id. with ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858-65.
113. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45.
114. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345-46.
115. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
[Vol. 33:103
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At best, the CDA indecency and patently offensive terms mean the same as part
(b) of the Miller obscenity standard."6 But,' the majority noted that Miller re-
quires the open-endedness of its patently offensive standard to be closed by
state laws specifically describing what material the state deems to be patently
offensive."' The majority also noted that part (b) deals only with sexual con-
duct, while the CDA includes depictions of excretory activities and sexual and
excretory organs."'
Moreover, the majority stated that all three prongs of the Miller test are
required to keep it from being unconstitutionally vague."9 The majority espe-
cially cited the importance of part (c), which sets a national floor as to what
may be literary, artistic, political or scientific value so as to "impose some
limitations and regularity on the definition ... ."' To the majority, this was
very important because under Miller, parts (a) and (b) are judged by purely
local opinion so each state has an opportunity to assert its unique values as to
what appeals to the prurient interest and what is patently offensive.' Thus,
the majority found that the CDA's exclusive reliance on the terms "indecent"
and "patently offensive" to describe the expressions that it proscribes under-
mines the whole rationale, which is "to establish a uniform national standard of
content regulation" of Internet speech. 2
D. The CDA Deemed Unconstitutionally Overbroad
As did Judge Sloviter, the majority held that the CDA is unconstitutionally
overbroad. In coming to this holding, much of the majority's overbreadth analy-
sis substantially paralleled that of Judge Sloviter. Thus, the majority found that,
in the cause of protecting children from harmful speech, the CDA "suppresses a
large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to
address to one another."'" It found that a main cause of this overbreadth is
the CDA's failure to define the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive."'2 4
The majority also found that the overbreadth of this case was unprecedented,
because:
* Its coverage is not limited to commercial speakers, it reaches non-profits
and private speakers; and
* "[T]he 'community standards' criterion as applied to the Internet means
that any communication available to a nation-wide audience will be judged






122. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45 n.39.
123. Id. at 2346.
124. See id. at 2347, wherein the majority stated its belief that by leaving these terms undefined, the CDA
covers large amounts of non-pornographic material.
19971
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by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the mes-
sage."'
' 2
The majority recited two original hypothetical examples of the CDA's
overbreadth which were premised on the proposition that "[i]t is at least clear
that the strength of government's interest in protecting minors is not equally
strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute."'" Thus, said the majori-
ty,
Under the CDA, a parent allowing her 17 year-old to use the family com-
puter to obtain information on the Internet, that she, in her parental judg-
ment, deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term.... Similarly,
a parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman information on birth
control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though neither he, his child,
nor anyone in their home community, found the material "indecent" or
"patently offensive," if the college town's community thought other-
wise."'
The majority also rejected the government's defenses mostly for the same
reasons Judge Sloviter rejected them. In essence, the majority found that the
technology for using the CDA's affirmative defenses does not exist, and, even
if such technology did exist, there was no evidence introduced suggesting that it
would effectively keep minors from being exposed to indecent material." It
also found that such technology would be too expensive for non-commercial
speakers and some commercial speakers to use."" Moreover, the majority
found that methods enabling Internet receivers to block offensive material were
now, and likely to be in the future, as effective in protecting children from
indecent material as screening methods enabling Internet speakers to select their
audience on the basis of age.3 This finding is important, because the block-
ing methods impose less burdens on Internet speakers, and the burdens the
CDA impose "on adult speech [are] unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose... [of] the
statute ... ,,1 In short, the majority refused "to rely on unproven future
technology to save the statute."' 2
Apart from the issue of technology effectiveness, the government argued
that the CDA's "knowledge" and "specific child" requirements save the CDA
from overbreadth 33 The essence of this argument is that these requirements
insulate Internet speakers from CDA prosecution unless they send indecent
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2348.
127. Id.
128. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2349. So, for example, the majority noted that tagging material with content
warnings would be ineffective unless third parties beyond the control of Internet speakers, such as parents,
took steps to use the warnings. See id. Similarly, the majority expressed doubts that credit card and adult code
verification processes could successfully keep all minors from accessing indecent material. Id.
129. See id. at 2347, 2349.
130. See id. at 2347.
131. Id. at 2346.
132. Id. at 2350.
133. See id. at 2349.
[Vol. 33:103
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material to someone they know is under age 18." The government further
argued that such a requirement does not affect speakers' abilities to disseminate
material to adults.' Noting that "most Internet fora... are open to all com-
ers," the majority held that these requirements do not save the CDA because
they:
would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a "heckler's
veto," upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on
and inform the would-be discoursers that his 17-year-old child-a "specif-
ic person... under the age of 18 years of age,"... -would be pres-
ent.
136
On appeal, the government argued that the Act's prohibitions are limited to
material lacking "redeeming social value."'37 The majority rejected this notion,
stating "we find no textual support for the government's submission that mate-
rial having scientific, educational, or other redeeming social value will necessar-
ily fall outside the CDA's 'patently offensive' and 'indecent' prohibitions.' 3 8
Given the inability of Internet speakers to control who receives their mes-
sages, the majority concluded that the CDA effectively acts as a ban on the
dissemination of indecent but protected speech on the Internet. 39 Citing Sable,
the majority asserted that it had no duty to "defer to the congressional judgment
that nothing less than a total ban would be effective in preventing enterprising
youngsters from gaining access to indecent communications,"'" especially
when that judgment was made on a congressional record containing little sup-
porting evidence.' Thus, the majority reasserted the Court's duty to make an
independent judgment as to whether "Congress has designed its statute to ac-




In a vain attempt to get the district court's overbreadth holding reversed,
the government argued that censorship of chat rooms, newsgroups, and mail
exploders should be accepted constitutionally because the World Wide Web is
still available on the Internet for the restricted speech to occur.43 In response,
the majority noted that unless existing Web sites accommodated the speaker, it
would cost $10,000 plus the costs of database management and age verification
to send his or her message over the Web." This, said the majority, "is equiv-
alent to arguing that a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as





139. See id. at 2346.
140. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2346.
141. See id. at 2346-47 n.41.
142. Id. at 2347, (quoting Denver Area Educ. Teleconum. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,2385
(1996)).




Allison: The Cyberwar of 1997: Timidity and Sophistry at the First Amendme
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1997
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
individuals are free to publish books."'4 Constitutionally, the bottom line for
the majority was that this is a time, place and manner argument inapplicable to
the determination of whether the content regulations of the CDA are constitu-
tional. '
Finally, the majority concluded that the CDA's speech restriction amounted
to "burning the house to roast the pig."'4 As a consequence, "[t]he CDA...
threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet community."'
4
E. The CDA Not Saved by Severance
In its oral argument, the government stated what the majority characterized
as its "ultimate fall-back position:" asking the Court to use a severability clause
applicable to the CDA to sever unconstitutional provisions that are severable,
and to narrow the construction of questionable nonseverable provisions so they
will be constitutional. 49 The majority declared that only the indecent transmis-
sion provision had text that could be severed."s It then excised the word inde-
cent from the indecent transmission provision, leaving it intact as a valid re-
striction on the dissemination of obscene material.'
As to the nonseverable provisions, the government asked the Court not to
invalidate them as to "application[s] to 'other persons or circumstances' that
might be constitutionally permissible."'' In response, the majority noted that
such action would violate the terms of the CDA's expedited appeal provision,
which permitted the CDA to be challenged only facially.5 3 It also found that
"[tihe open-ended character of the CDA provides no guidance what ever for
limiting its coverage."'" Under these circumstances, the majority said it
would be an inappropriate act of judicial legislation to provide a narrowing
interpretation.'
F. Internet Does Not Need Fostering by CDA
On appeal, the government alleged that the CDA should be upheld as a
tool for fostering the growth of the Internet.'56 This was summarily rejected
by the majority as being unsupported by the facts, which reveal that the Internet
has expanded dramatically in the last few years. 7
145. Id. at 2348-49.
146. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980)).





152. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2350.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 2351.
156. See id.
157. See id. In that regard, the majority noted at the outset of its opinion that:
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V. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S PARTIAL CONCURRENCE, PARTIAL DISSENT
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority that the display provision is
unconstitutional, because the lack of screening technology makes it impossible
to construe the display provision in a manner that does not bar adults from
receiving constitutionally protected speech. 5' However, she accepted the
government's argument that the indecent transmission and specific person provi-
sions should be construed to contain a knowledge requirement." 9 As con-
strued, she held that these provisions were constitutional as applied to one adult
sending a message he or she knows will be received only by minors." She
justified her holding by observing that this requirement "in no way restricts the
adult's ability to communicate with other adults.... As an example, she stated
that restricting what one adult can say to one or more minors in a chat room
does not restrict what he or she can say to other adults, because there are no
other adults participating in the chat room conversation and the adult speaker
remains free to send indecent messages to adults in other conversations not
involving the minors.'62
In reaching these conclusions, Justice O'Connor analyzed the CDA in a
much different manner than did the majority. She characterized the CDA simply
as an attempt to create restricted cyberspeech zones where minors are not pres-
ent and adults are free to receive indecent communications." She was
prompted to pursue this analysis by prior First Amendment cases that permit the
creation of restricted speech zones as long as:
* Adults' access to protected speech is not unduly restricted; and
* "minors have no First Amendment right to read or view the banned materi-
a.))164
Justice O'Connor recited how previous attempts to create restricted speech
zones involved a physical world where adults can be effectively segregated by
geography and identity."e But, she asserted that this physical world model is
The number of "host" computers-those that store information and relay communications-increased
from about 300 in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of the trial in 1996. Roughly 60% of
theses hosts are located in the United States. About 40 million people used the Internet at the time of
trial, a number that is expected to mushroom to 200 million by 1999.
Id. at 2334.
158. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 2355.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 2351. She adopted this characterization because in her view, the CDA does not purport "to
keep indecent (or patently offensive) material away from adults, who have a First Amendment right to obtain
this speech." Id. at 2352 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
"Thus, [she concluded that] the undeniable purpose of the CDA is to segregate indecent material on the
Internet into certain areas minors cannot access:' Id.
164. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2353. As an example of such zoning approved by the U.S. Supreme Court, Jus-
tice O'Connor cited the case of, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1967) where "the Court sustained
a New York law that barred store owners from selling pornographic magazines to minors in part because
adults could still buy [them]." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2353.
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inapplicable to the Internet, because:
* Gateway technology, the means by which Internet speakers can exclude
persons from receiving Internet communications based on their identities,
remains unavailable to some Web speakers and "is just now becoming
technologically feasible for chat rooms and USENET newsgroups;"'"
and
* Blocking technology, the means by which Internet receivers can shield
themselves and their families from certain Internet sites, is still not avail-
able. 6 7
Therefore, she sustained the majority judgment that the display provision is
unconstitutional, because "until gateway technology is available throughout
cyberspace, ... the only way for a speaker to avoid liability under the CDA is
to refrain completely from using indecent speech.""'
As noted above, Justice O'Connor concluded that communications where a
single adult knows he or she is communicating only with minors constitute
segregated zones, so that prohibiting the adult from sending indecent communi-
cations to the minors within these zones will not interfere with any other adult's
right to receive indecent communications at other Internet sites." As a conse-
quence, she was willing to construe the indecent transmission and specific per-
son provisions as covering only these type of Internet communications for pur-
poses of denying minors access to "indecent" or "patently offensive"
speech.17
0
This zoning analysis did not address the vagueness and overbreadth issues.
Turning to these issues, Justice O'Connor stated that her narrowing construction
would still not save the indecent transmission and specific person provisions if
the CDA's prohibitions on sending "indecent" or "patently offensive" communi-
cations to minors deprive minors of speech they are entitled to receive.' 7' The
range of speech minors are entitled to receive is narrower than the range of
protected adult speech, for the U.S. Supreme Court has held that material not
obscene as to adults may still be obscene as to minors." 2 Speech is obscene
as to minors if it "(i) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable... for minors, (ii) ap-
peals to the prurient interest of minors; and (iMi) is utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors.""'
Justice O'Connor concedes that the CDA could ban some material that is
not obscene as to minors "[blecause the CDA denies minors the right to obtain
material that is 'patently offensive'--even if it has some redeeming value for
166. Id. at 2354.
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 2354-55.
170. See Reno, 117 S. CL at 2355.
171. See id. at 2356.
172. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632-38 (1967).
173. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633).
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minors and even if it does not appeal to their prurient interests .... 174 Nev-
ertheless, she refused to deem the CDA to be unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad, for she contended that in cases involving facial challenges there
must be "proof of 'real' and 'substantial' overbreadth."'75 Justice O'Connor
asserted that the plaintiffs and the majority had not offered such proof, because
they failed to state examples of speech that was indecent or patently offensive
as to minors but still offered minors socially redeeming value. 176 In particular,
she stated her opinion that "discussion about prison rape or nude art... may
have some redeeming education value for adults, [but] they do not necessarily
have any such value for minors .... ."" Astoundingly, she also asserted that
e-mail conversations between minors and adult family members could be the
basis of a CDA prosecution, because there is "no support for the legal proposi-
tion that such speech is absolutely immune from regulation.""17
VI. CRITIQUE
A. The Internet's Victory Could Be Statutorily Reversed
Thanks to Reno, all Internet speakers are free from government content
regulation of their protected speech. But, the terms of that victory present a
recipe for a content regulating statute that could possibly be imposed constitu-
tionally on some classes of Internet speakers.
This statute would:
* Apply to Internet speakers who the FCC has determined through
rulemaking proceedings belong to classes of Internet speakers that could
deny minors access to their communications by using screening methods
the FCC has found to be economically and technically feasible for such
classes to use;
* Impose a duty on such Internet speakers to use an FCC approved screening
method appropriate to their class if they have been found in an FCC com-
plaint procedure to have disseminated over the Internet material which de-
scribes, depicts or shows sexual or excretory activities or organs in a pa-
tently offensive way as measured by contemporary community standards
for the Internet medium;
* Establish a complaint procedure so that persons encountering "patently
offensive" material over the Internet may initiate FCC proceedings to de-
termine whether the Internet speaker responsible for the dissemination of
that material should be required to deploy an FCC approved screening
method;
* Provide as absolute defenses:
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2356-57.
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** the use of an FCC approved screening technology or
** a determination that the aggregate effectiveness of Internet receivers
using FCC approved blocking methods in restricting minors' access to
the patently offensive material will be equal to or better than the
effectiveness of the Internet speaker using an FCC approved screening
method;
* Authorize the FCC to:
** monitor developments of screening and blocking methods,
** determine through rulemaking proceedings which methods are effec-
tive in denying minors access to patently offensive material on the
Intemet,
** determine through rulemaking proceedings which classes of Internet
speakers have available to them effective screening methods that are
technically and economically feasible for denying minors access to
their communications; and
** determine through rulemaking proceedings which classes of Internet
communications can be kept from minors as effectively by Internet
receivers using blocking methods as by Internet speakers using screen-
ing methods;
* Impose civil fines on Internet speakers who violate FCC orders to deploy
an approved screening method.
Such a statute should have a fighting chance of surviving vagueness and over-
breadth attacks, provided it is enacted after the Congress engages in in-depth
hearings about the extent of patently offensive material on the Internet and the
availability of technically and economically feasible screening and blocking
methods.179
First, the proposed statute eliminates the prospects of criminal prosecution
by substituting administrative regulation backed by civil fines for penal regula-
tions backed by criminal penalties. This substitution should go a long way to-
ward convincing the Court to judge the statute by the relaxed First Amendment
standards applicable to broadcast media and cable TV. For in eliminating the
extraordinary chilling effect criminal penalties have on the exercise of protected
speech,"to and subjecting the Internet to regulation by an agency charged with
becoming expert about its unique characteristics, the statute possesses two of
the criteria the Reno majority found were major factors in the Court adopting
more relaxed First Amendment standards in Pacifica.'8
Second, the proposed statute will neither ban indecent speech from the
179. Such hearings would overcome the Supreme Court's concerns that the CDA was not enacted on the
basis of sound Congressional findings. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2338 n.24, 2346 n.41.
180. Both the Supreme Court and the district court expressed great concern about the chilling effect crimi-
nal statutes have on the exercise of First Amendment rights. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45; ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824, 855-56 (E.D. Pa. 1996), 864-65.
181. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342-43, where the Court refused to apply the relaxed First Amendment
standards of Pacifica to the CDA because it contained criminal penalties and the Internet has not been sub-
jected to regulation by an expert administrative agency.
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Internet nor deny adults access to material they have a right to receive. It frees
from regulation all Internet speakers deemed by the FCC to not have access to
technically and economically feasible screening methods for denying minors
access to their indecent speech. Internet speakers complying with FCC regula-
tions requiring them to use FCC approved screening methods may disseminate
indecent speech to those who pass the screening process without fear of being
penalized. Thus, the proposed statute operates only to insure that indecent
speech is channeled away from minors whenever it is feasible to do so, which
was precisely the goal of the FCC order and regulations at issue in Pacifica."
By merely mandating the use of means for channelling indecent speech, rather
than effectively banning it from the Internet, the proposed statute possesses a
third criterion that the Reno majority found was a significant factor in the Paci-
fica Court approving relaxed First Amendment standards."'
Third, the substitution of administrative process for criminal prosecution
may also help this statute withstand vagueness and overbreadth attacks, even
though it uses language substantially identical to the CDA provisions struck
down in Reno because their vagueness produced unconstitutional overbreadth.
Just last term, in Denver Telecom, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
section 10(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992 [the Cable Act]," in the face of a vagueness attack." Section
10(a) permits cable operators to prohibit "programming that the cable operator
reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs
in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards.""' This language is virtually identical to the language of the CDA's
display and specific person provisions, and therefore does not include the pruri-
ent interest and socially redeeming value prongs of the Miller obscenity test.
Nevertheless, in the context of the permissive non-criminal content regulation
scheme at issue in Denver Telecom, a four Justice plurality" rebuffed a
vagueness attack on section 10(a) because it contained one of the three prongs
of the Miller obscenity standard, came with a legislative history suggesting that
it would not be applied to scientific or educational programs, and contained
procedural safeguards to protect speakers against overly broad applications. 8
Similarly, the proposed statute contains one of the three prongs of Miller's
obscenity standard, provides procedural safeguards to protect Internet speakers
from overly broad applications, and could come with a legislative or administra-
tive history making it clear that it will not be applied to scientific and educa-
tional programs. It is true that, in not containing all the prongs of the Miller
182. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 733 (1978).
183. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342-43.
184. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994).
185. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2389-90 (1996).
186. The Cable Act, § 10(a), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994).
187. The plurality consisted of Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justices Stevens, O'Connor and
Souter. See Denver Telecom, 116 S. Ct. at 2382-90.
188. See Denver Telecom, 116 S. Ct. at 2389-90.
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obscenity standard, the proposed statute will cover more material than that
which is deemed constitutionally obscene.'89 But, this argument was rejected
in Pacifica, where the regulations were expressly designed to regulate indecent
speech that did not necessarily appeal to the prurient interest or might have
socially redeeming value as to adults." For in Pacifica, the Court accepted
content regulation of protected speech because, as does the proposed statute, the
regulation was enforced by administrative, not criminal, process and it chan-
neled, rather than banned, the offensive material.'9'
Fourth, the proposed statute tailors its contemporary community standards
requirement to the medium to which it is applied. This cures the omission
Judge Buckwalter found made the CDA's display and specific person provisions
unconstitutionally vague."s It also satisfies the medium-specific context re-
quirement of Pacifica, where the Court emphasized that the Pacifica regulations
were judged to be constitutional in light of the unique characteristics of the
broadcast radio medium."
Fifth, even if the Court persists in holding that the Internet's unique char-
acteristics immunize it from Pacifica's relaxed First Amendment Standards, the
proposed statute can be easily modified to meet the Ginsburg standards so as to
still permit the FCC to regulate some speech that is protected as to adults. The
type of content regulation approved by the Court in Ginsburg amounts to adult
speech zoning, where purveyors of communications deemed obscene only as to
minors are required to take steps reasonably calculated to deny minors, but not
adults, access to the proscribed speech.'94
189. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344-46 (1997) (wherein the majority finds the CDA to be
constitutionally overbroad because its display and specific person provisions contain only one of the three
prongs of the Miller obscenity standard).
190. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 741 (1978) (where the Court stated that "neither our prior
decisions nor the language and history of § 1464 supports the conclusion that prurient appeal is an essential
component of indecent language. . . "). See also id. at 732 n.5, where the Court referred to an FCC sugges-
tion that "if an offensive broadcast had literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and were preceded by
warnings, it might not be indecent in the late evening, but would be so during the day, when children are in
the audience." Id.
191. See id. at 733, 744-46, 747 (especially n.25), 750 (especially n.28), 751. As to the channeling aspect
of the regulation, the Court concluded that "when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the
exercise of its regulatory power does not depend upon proof that the pig is obscene." Id. at 750-51. See also
Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342 (where the majority refused to apply Pacifica to the CDA in part because the CDA
involved criminal, rather than administrative, process and effectively banned, rather than channeled, the offen-
sive speech).
192. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 862-63 (E.D. Pa. 1996) where Judge Buckwalter observed
that:
Notably.... in [the] telephone and cable television cases the FCC had defined indecent as patently
offensive by references to contemporary standards for that particular medium.... Here, the provi-
sion is not so limited. In fact, there is no effort to conform the restricting terms to the medium of
cyberspace, as is required by'Pacifica and its progeny.
Id.
193. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-51.
194. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Such adult
speech zoning has been successfully applied by the states to movie theaters and live performance venues. See
id. at 2352 n.1 (O'Connor, J., partial concurrence, partial dissent) (citing to a myriad of state
statutes prohibiting the access of minors to various adult entertainments); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758 (Powell,
J., concurring opinion) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1967) for the proposition that
"[s]ellers of printed and recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live performances may be
24
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The proposed statute would meet the Ginsburg adult speech zoning re-
quirements if it were amended to apply only to Internet speech matching
Ginsburg's definition of material that is obscene as to minors. The required
amendments need only make it clear that the Internet communications regulated
by the proposed statute are "'patently offensive to prevailing standards in the
adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable.., for minors';
[appeal] to the prurient interest of minors; and [are] 'utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors."'"" By limiting its reach to Internet speakers
with access to feasible screening methods, and providing that the use of those
methods is an absolute defense, the proposed statute simply requires affected
Internet speakers to take actions the FCC believes will be reasonably effective
in denying minors access to their communications while leaving the Internet
speakers fully capable of reaching their intended adult audiences. These limita-
tions should also take care of two other concerns the Reno majority expressed
in denying Ginsburg treatment to the CDA: the CDA's lack of a parental con-
sent exemption and its application to non-commercial speakers.19 In contrast
to the CDA, the proposed statute will permit minors to gain access to adult
speech zones on the Internet only by giving the purveyors of those zones the
proper screening information, which they will not be able to do without a
parent's cooperation unless they commit fraud or theft. The proposed statute
may reach some non-commercial Internet speakers, but only those who can
technically and economically screen minors from their intended audiences with-
out significantly burdening their abilities to communicate with adults. Although
the Ginsburg statute applied only to commercial speakers, it did not prohibit
governments from regulating non-commercial speakers whose speech produces
the harm the Ginsburg statute was designed to prevent."9 Finally, even though
the Reno majority seems to have found constitutional significance in the CDA
covering minors up to 17 years of age while the Ginsburg statute covered mi-
nors below age 16,198 it is hard to believe the Court would find unconstitu-
tional a regulatory scheme that is administrative, produces no speech bans, and
permits adults to have access to all protected adult speech simply because it
covers minors 17 years of age.
required to shut their doors to children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults' access").
195. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., partially concurring and partially dissenting) (quoting
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633).
196. See id. at 2341.
197. See id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J. partially concurring, partially dissenting) (where Justice O'Connor
opined that there is "no support for the legal proposition that... speech [between minors and family mem-
bers] is absolutely immune from regulation"). It is also interesting to note that, presently, commercial
pornographers comprise the one class of speakers that is making extensive use of screening methods. See id.
at 2340, 2349; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 879 (Dalzell, J.).
198. See id. at 2341.
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B. The Internet May Be Exempt From Protected Speech Regulations
Notwithstanding the above analysis, the Reno outcome was in part based
on the majority's view that First Amendment protections must be tailored to the
Internet's unique characteristics as a communication medium.'" It could be
that the Court will ultimately find that the Internet's unique characteristics qual-
ify it for permanent exemption from regulation of protected speech.'
In Reno, the majority focussed on two unique Internet characteristics to
justify its decision not to apply the relaxed First Amendment standards applica-
ble to broadcasting to the Internet."eI First, the majority found that the Internet
is not afflicted by a scarcity of key operational resources as is the
broadcasting industry.' Second, the majority concurred with the district
court's findings that:
* "Communications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's home
or appear on one's computer screen unbidden,"
* "Users seldom encounter content 'by accident,"'
* "Almost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the
content," and
* "[the] 'odds are slim' that a user would come across a sexually explicit
sight [sic] by accident."
In addition, the district court also found that:
* "Although content on the Internet is just a few clicks of a mouse away
from the user, the receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of
affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial,"
and
* "A child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve
material and thereby to use the Internet unattended."'
Thus, the majority limited the reach of Pacifica to media that have the
potential to surprise a receiver with unwanted offensive speech simply by being
turned on and classified the Internet more as a communications medium with
user access characteristics similar to the telephone than as an entertainment
medium such as radio or television.'
It would be foolish for Internet advocates to rely on the scarcity of opera-
199. See id. at 2343-44.
200. That certainly was the view of Judge Dalzell. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 867, 872-83. But Judge
Buckwalter expressly stated it was too early in the Internet's development to come to that conclusion See id.
at 859. Justice O'Connor appeared to suggest that the Internet's constitutional status could change depending
on future developments of screening and blocking technologies. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2353-54. The ma-
jority placed heavy emphasis on Internet characteristics and the status of screening and blocking technologies
that could change. See id. at 2343-44 (Internet characteristics), 2349-50 (screening and blocking technologies).
201. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
202. See id. at 2344, where the majority found that because the Internet "provides relatively unlimited,
low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds," including "not only traditional print and news services, but
also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue.... our cases provide no basis
for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium." Id.
203. Id. at 2343 (citing District Court Finding 88, ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 844-45).
204. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 845 (citing District Court Finding 89).
205. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
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tional resources rationale to provide the Internet with a permanent exemption
from the regulation of protected speech. Just last term, in Denver Telecom, a
four Justice plurality of the Court relied heavily on Pacifica's rationale to up-
hold content regulation of protected speech on leased access cable TV chan-
nels, despite the Court's express finding in Turner I that the First Amend-
ment rules applicable to broadcasting were inapplicable to cable TV because
cable TV was not afflicted with a scarcity of key operational resources.
Moreover, rapid growth in the number of Internet users is straining the adequa-
cy of key resources needed to handle the increased traffic, including the public
switched telephone networks of local exchange telephone companies,"ss the
connections that carry information from one Internet computer to another
(known as "pipes" or band-width),' and the resources of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) for keeping up with their rapidly expanding points of presence
(POPs).2 0 As a consequence, the Internet may soon experience scarcities of key
operational resources,' a key factor the Court has used to justify regulating
the content of protected speech on broadcast media.
The district court's findings accepted by the Supreme Court concerning the
relative difficulty of children encountering indecent material on the Internet are
questionable, inconsistent with other district court findings, not likely to be true
in the future, and irrelevant to the adult speech zoning rationale for regulation.
Every medium has a protocol that potential receivers must choose to follow to
gain access to the expressive material it offers. In that sense, no communica-
tions on any medium, including radio, TV, telephone or Internet, "invade" a
home or appear unbidden.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has three times in eight years attached
great constitutional significance to the fact that some media require receivers to
take more steps than others to access the expressive material they offer. In
Sable, the Court refused to apply relaxed First Amendment standards applicable
to broadcasting to telephone Dial-a-Porn services in great part because
"[pilacing a telephone call is not the same as turning on a radio dial and being
206. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385-87 (1996),
wherein Justice Breyer used Pacifica to justify regulating protected speech on cable TV because he found
cable TV and broadcast TV subjected children to the risk of being exposed to patently offensive material in
similar ways.
207. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456-57 (1994). Here, the Court expressly
found that "given the rapid advances in fiber optics and digital compression technology, soon there may be no
practical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the cable medium." Id.
208. See Eric Krapf, Why the 'Net won't cause PSTN meltdown; public switched telephone network, 27
Business COMM'N REV. 36 (1997).
209. See Frank Ruiz, Growth, overload seem destined to crash Internet, THE TAMPA TRIBuNE, Business
& Finance Section p. 3, December 30, 1996 Final Edition.
210. See id.
211. But see, William Schrader, Why the Internet crash will never happen; State of the Art;
Internet/WeblOnline Service Information, in 31 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 25 (1997) for an alternative view
contending that "[t]he Internet is here to stay as the platform by which businesses routinely interact with
suppliers, reach out to customers, and streamline their own internal functions," and answering a number of
charges, he calls myths, that the Internet is doomed to crash. Id.
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taken by surprise by an indecent message." '212 Moreover, the Court in Sable
went on to state that "[u]nlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the
message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so
invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding expo-
sure to it."'213 Conversely, in Denver Telecom, the four Justice Plurality ap-
plied relaxed First Amendment standards to cable TV after finding that cable
TV is as pervasive, accessible to children, and capable of exposing citizens
without warning to patently offensive material in the privacy of their own
homes as is radio.2" In Reno, the majority ignored the district court's findings
that a person using a computer in his or her home can "accidently retrieve
material of a sexual nature through an imprecise search."2 " The Reno majority
also ignored the fact that chat room participants often have unwanted sexual
advances or materials thrust on them by cybersexual predators.2 6 So, it would
seem that the Internet is a medium where a receiver can be surprised by un-
wanted exposures to indecent material or communications.
What then is the great difference between the Internet and Cable TV that
justifies treating them so differently? The Reno majority seems to say that the
difference is that people are more likely to encounter indecent material acciden-
tally on broadcast media than on the Internet."7 Intuitively, this assertion
seems questionable. Given that many people have a good idea what they will
encounter at various times on cable TV,21 the truly accidental encounters with
indecent material on cable TV may be no greater on a percentage basis than
those on the Internet. If there is such a difference, its magnitude is likely to
diminish in the future as cyberentrepreneurs compete vigorously for technology
breakthroughs that will permit the Internet to fuse seamlessly with televi-
212. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989).
213. Id.
214. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386-87 (1996).
215. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing District Court Finding 84).
216. As one recent article reported, "[c]hat rooms offer still another challenge. Public chat groups aren't
always monitored and private ones never are monitored, unless improprieties are reported to service providers.
Experts warn children to avoid private chat rooms-that's where predators, often posing as children, work
best" Stacie Zoe Berg, Helping Kids to Surf Safely, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1997, at Part Life, p. 42. And,
another article reported on parents' experience as follows:
Although she did spend some time with her boys while they chatted online, she could not sit with
them all the time, and they found their way into private chat rooms, where they were offered, and
accepted, pornographic pictures.
"This might have gone on for some time if my husband had not noted that the memory of our com-
puter was rapidly filling up," Elliott said, describing the pictures as "lewd and obscene by any stan-
dards."
"Was any lasting damage done?" she wondered. "I would say 'Yes'-not because my children have
become victims of sexual predators-but because one of their early sexual images will, forever, be
something which is not tender or beautiful, or even harmlessly titillating; but something which is
coarse, vile and ugly."
Debra Gersh Hernandez, Controlling Cyberporn: Numerous First Amendment questions arise as the govern.
ment attempts to regulate content of online information services, ED. & PUB. MAG., Aug. 26, 1995, at 35.
217. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct 2329, 2343 (1997).
218. See, e.g., Justice Thomas' assertion in Denver Telecom that "[m]ost sexually oriented programming
[on cable TV] appears on premium or pay-per-view channels that are naturally blocked from nonpaying cus-
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In any event, one Internet characteristic certainly will continue to exist:
Curious kids will be attracted to its many sexual offerings. In this respect, it
is no different than the bookstores selling dirty books that were the subject of
regulation in Ginsburg. The government still has an interest in the "well-being
of its children" and in supporting "parents' claim to authority in their own
household."' A statute designed to establish adult speech zones, as proposed
above, will further that interest in a manner likely to meet the Court's strict
scrutiny test, for it will keep minors away from material deemed obscene as to
them while allowing adults to have access to all protected adult speech.tm
The Internet does possess one characteristic that could be the silver bullet
enabling Internet supporters to fend off protected speech regulation permanent-
ly. "Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that
content from entering any community." m This means using contemporary
community standards to judge whether an Internet communication is obscene as
to minors will inevitably give control over whether an Internet speaker will be
regulated to the community that least tolerates speech with sexual content 4
Just requiring an Internet speaker to screen its viewers imposes burdens on First
Amendment rights, because potential receivers will be subjected to a process
that will delay their access to the regulated speaker's communications' and
strip them of their anonymity. The combination of delay and invasion of
privacy could discourage potential receivers from attempting to gain access to
the communications of Internet speakers subject to a screening requirement.'
If the community with the least tolerance of sexual materials can force an
Internet speaker to implement screening technology, then receivers in communi-
ties not offended by the speaker's communication must bear the costs of up-
holding the views of the complaining community. The Court may see this col-
lective burden as too great a burden on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
On the other hand, the Court may not permit the adoption of a national standard
for determining what is patently offensive, since in Miller it determined that
"our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably ex-
pect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 states in a single formu-
219. See John Markoff, A Face-Off on TV Link to the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, at DS.
220. See Sonya Colberg, Sex.Com: Precocious Youths Can Search Net for Excitement, THE TULSA
WORID, Aug. 17, 1997, at Dl, wherein it was reported that more that 937,000 matches appeared when "sex"
is used as a search term, while more than a million more entries appeared in response to phrases like "hot
girls" and "hot hunks." See also Stacie Berg, Helping Kids to Surf Safely, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997 Part
Life, at p.42 (wherein it was reported that "PC Meter, a market-research company, found that in May, 11 per-
cent of kids between ages 2 and 11, and 25 percent of teens ages 12 and 17, visited Web sites containing
nudity').
221. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1967).
222. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
224. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347.
225. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 846-47.
226. See id. at 849.
227. See id. at 846-47, 849.
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C. Reno May Have Refuted Denver Telecom's Relaxed Standards
In Denver Telecom, a four-Justice Plurality rejected the traditional strict
scrutiny First Amendment standard applicable to content regulation in favor of a
more flexible scrutiny standard.229 It did so out of concern that past First
Amendment standards may not fit a rapidly changing telecommunications sec-
tor.' Specifically, under this standard "government may directly regulate
speech to address extraordinary problems, where its regulations are appropriate-
ly tailored to resolve those problems without imposing an unnecessarily great
restriction on speech."' This standard is weaker than the traditional First
Amendment standard, which states that content regulation of protected speech is
unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest." The Court intended this standard to be weaker so as to give the gov-
ernment more flexibility to regulate protected speech as a means of meeting
perceived new problems arising from rapidly changing technology." Given
how rapidly telecommunications technology is changing, this more flexible
scrutiny virtually licenses government to engage in greater censorship. Fortu-
nately, in Reno, a case involving a medium awash in changing technology, the
Court did not even mention the flexible scrutiny standard of Denver Telecom
even though Reno's two opinions were authored by two of its four creators.
Perhaps this silence signifies the well-deserved death of the aberrational logic of
the Denver Telecom Plurality.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the short term, Internet devotees will surely praise Reno because it
saved Internet speakers from a government attempt to regulate their protected
speech. Unfortunately, the terms of the Internet's victory in Reno may not have
provided the Internet with permanent relief from this type of censorship. For the
majority opinion could be viewed either as a declaration that the Internet has
been permanently exempted from protected speech regulation because of its
unique characteristics or simply as a rejection of a flawed statute. The distinc-
tion is crucial, because if Reno is just a rejection of a flawed statute, the gov-
ernment may in the future succeed in subjecting the Internet to protected speech
regulation by enacting a new statute with more precisely defined terms. More-
over, even if Reno is viewed as having classified the Internet as a medium
exempt from protected speech regulation, the protection it extends may only be
228. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1972).
229. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2384-87 (1996).
230. See id. at 2384-85.
231. See id. at 2385.
232. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1988).
233. See Denver Telecom, 116 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
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temporary if the Internet does not continue to exhibit the characteristics used by
the Court to justify the exemption.
Beyond its effects on the Internet, Reno may have a longer lasting impact
as to what First Amendment standards the Court uses to determine the constitu-
tionality of speech content regulations imposed on communications media un-
dergoing profound technological and economic change. For although it did not
expressly reject the woefully relaxed First Amendment standard newly created
and applied last term in Denver Telecom, the Court appears to have impliedly
rejected it simply by using without comment its traditional strict scrutiny stan-
dard.
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